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bstract
This paper analyzed how the main economies have used the antidumping measures (AD) after the Uruguay round, between
995 and 2012. Therefore, some techniques were employed in order to reveal the main AD users and the trend, of using this
nstrument, associated to each one of them. We also tested the hypothesis that countries could converge in terms of the number of
D cases and if spatial effects could be involved in this process. Finally, a criterion was established and a model was estimated
n order to identify countries that usually favor the most competitive sectors through AD practice. The results revealed that Brazil
as the only heavy AD user that was counter to the general downward trend verified on the AD cases. Meanwhile, China was
ot only the main target of this mechanism but the cases against this country showed a growth trend also. Furthermore, we
ound that the number of AD cases opened by traditional and nontraditional users is converging. Finally, both the index and the
stimated model have indicated that Turkey and the EU seem to be favoring the most competitive industries through the AD
ractice.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
EL classiﬁcation: F10; F13; F14; F15
eywords: International economy; Commercial policy; Trade barriers; Antidumping
esumo
Este artigo analisou o uso do mecanismo antidumping (AD) após a rodada Uruguai, entre 1995 e 2012. Para tanto, técnicas foram
mpregadas no intuito de revelar os principais usuários do AD e a tendência de uso associada a estes. A hipótese de que países
oderiam estar convergindo em termos da aberturas de casos AD e de que efeitos espaciais estariam envolvidos neste processo
ambém foram testadas. Por fim, um critério foi estabelecido e um modelo foi estimado a fim de identificar países que favorecem
s setores mais competitivos via AD. Os resultados revelaram que o Brasil foi o único grande usuário que esteve na contramão
a tendência geral de queda na abertura de casos AD. Enquanto isso, a China não apenas foi o principal alvo deste mecanismo
omo os casos AD, iniciados contra este país, apresentaram uma tendência de crescimento. Verificou-se ainda que o número de∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, Campus UFJF, José Lourenc¸o Kelmer Street, n/n, 36.036-900, Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais,
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casos AD, iniciados por tradicionais e não-tradicionais usuários deste instrumento, parece estar convergindo. Por fim, tanto o
índice quanto os modelos estimados indicaram que Turquia e União Europeia parecem usar o AD para favorecer as indústrias mais
competitivas.
© 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
Palavras-chave: Economia Internacional; Política Externa; Barreiras Comerciais; Antidumping
1.  Introduction
Since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) creation,1 in 1947, the world witnessed an effective
reduction of the traditional commercial barriers (Ossa, 2011). However, at the beginning of the 70s, by way of obscure
rules, a new kind of protective measure, termed “non-tariff barrier” (NTB), became largely used and was object of
discussion of GATT/WTO in the Tokyo Round during 1973–79 (Quinn and Slayton, 1982). The situation worsened in
the 80s and the antidumping  mechanism (AD) became known as the main NTB type in use at that time.2 According to
Bloningen and Prusa (2001, p. 1): “since  1980,  GATT/WTO  members  have  ﬁled  more  complaints  under  the  AD  statute
than under  all  other  trade  laws  combined,  or  that  more  AD  duties  are  now  levied  in  any  one  year  worldwide  than  were
levied in  the  entire  period  1947–1970.”
This scenario brought the AD measures back to the GATT/WTO negotiating table as the main subject on the agenda
during the Uruguay Round (1986–1994). Prusa (1999) argues that these meetings were marked by opposition between
the countries considered “traditional” users of the AD measures (headed by the USA and European Union) and the
“non-traditional” ones (mostly developing countries). Due to the USA’s and the European Community’s efforts, it was
not possible to restrict the use of the AD.
This result ended up increasing the use of this mechanism by nontraditional countries. According to Davis (2009, p.
3): “from the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid-1990s, other users began to emerge, and developing and emerging
economies now constitute the majority of users”. However, Aggarwal (2004) states that developing countries are not
yet entirely familiarized with the use of AD. Actually, they are using it as a way of retaliate the traditional users
due to their excessive number of AD cases opened against developing countries. He suggests that traditional users
should reduce their use against developing countries, in order to avoiding an even more excessive use of AD around
the world.3 In fact, even the use of AD by new users could spread the use of this mechanism by other countries.
According to Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008), there would be a “contagion effect” associated to AD. They argued
that some countries could learn by seeing other nearby countries using AD. These both effects together (retaliation
and contagion), could help to explain the proliferation of antidumping after Uruguay round.Although the antidumping  mechanism had been created for the purpose of avoiding unfair trade, preventing the big
businesses from monopolizing the market, some authors defend that it is only a new way of protectionism (Nelson,
2004; Davis, 2009) that could be used for political ends (Feinberg, 1989, 2005; Araújo et al., 2001; Aggarwal, 2004;
1 Later would become the World Trade Organization (WTO).
2 Regarding the obscure character of the AD legislation, Knetter and Prusa (2003) stated that two criteria must be met for it to be considered
dumping. First, there must be proof that the national industry suffered a great loss caused by importation. Secondly, the imported products must be
commercialized at inferior prices than the “normal price” of domestic market. Since the “normal price” is usually indirectly estimated, by taking
the export price charged in other countries (the price-based method) or via indicators associated to the production costs in the origin country (the
constructed-value method), the result may be questionable and even manipulated by regulatory agencies, exposing the AD mechanism to pressure
from the interest groups (e.g.: local businesses). Nelson (2004, p. 554–555), in discussing this mechanism, discloses that: “It is, instead, about
protection and, both because it wraps itself in the mantle of fairness and because it is obscure and because its details permit greater protection to
be delivered than would be the case with simple legislated protection, antidumping protection is particularly bad protection”. According to Evenett
(2006, p. 733): “An important feature of the implementation of anti-dumping laws is that there is considerable room for discretion by administering
ofﬁcials. (. . .) This is not to suggest that ofﬁcials are breaking the law, rather that they may be using the discretion available to them to respond to
incentives to supply protection to inﬂuential domestic interests and constituencies.”
3 According to him: “AD will spread among developing countries not only due to greater liberalization pressures but also due to the fact that
more and more countries would like to create an AD ability to counter the AD use against them. This may have chain effect on the use of AD and
may reverse the trade gains that liberalization may ensure to them. It is therefore important to retrain the use of AD against developing countries.”
(Aggarwal, 2004, p. 1053–1054).
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netter and Prusa, 2003; Niels and Francois, 2006; Vasconcelos and Firme, 2011). Theuringer and Weiss (2001) also
uggest that antidumping  could benefit the big businesses’ interests in detriment to the interests of firms with reduced
evel of competitiveness.
Therefore, since there was a turnaround among AD users after the Uruguay Round, this article seeks to analyze
ow countries began to use the antidumping  instrument in the 1995–2012 period. Thus, this paper not only updates
esearches as Araújo et al. (2001), but it also revises some issues that had been established by literature, such as the
efinition of the “traditional” and “non-traditional” countries that use this tool, proposed by Zanardi (2004). Besides
his, it advances in the subject by verifying whether: (1) the countries are converging in terms of the number of AD
ases; (2) there is some type of spatial effect associated with this process; (3) the AD measures could be being used in
rder to benefit the more competitive sectors, as was suggested by Theuringer and Weiss (2001).4
Besides this introduction, this present article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief history of the
ntidumping instrument evolution, as well as the main articles that motivated this project. Section 3 presents the
ethodology and database used to verify: (i) the associated trend to each WTO member regarding the use of AD after
he Uruguay round: (ii) the countries’ similarities when using the AD instrument; (iii) the hypothesis of convergence
f the number of AD cases among countries and whether there is some spatial autocorrelation in this process; (iv)
hich kinds of sectors have been favored by the AD mechanism. The results are presented in Section 4, followed by
onclusion and references.
.  The  evolution  in  the  use  of  the  Antidumping  instrument
The antidumping  mechanism (AD) was developed by GATT/WTO, based on the Viner (1923) definition, aiming to
void unfair competition. When dealing with international trade, this means that a domestic company could use this
nstrument whenever a foreign company would attempt to enter in its country selling products below the usual domestic
rice. Although the confirmation procedure of dumping  has been honed,5 it is still a target of various criticisms.
Nelson (2004) states that the antidumping  mechanism is used more for protection than for avoiding the unfair-trade.
ccording to him, it is due to the AD legislation itself, which is obscure and excessively detailed, and, in many cases,
llows the applicant to obtain a better protection than if it had sought other legal means.6 In the author’s opinion:
antidumping protection  is  particularly  bad  protection.  This  is  a classic  “political  economy  problem”:  a  policy  this
ad can’t  be  the  product  of  rational  policy  making,  it  must  be  the  product  of  a  process  distorted  by  politics.”  Davis
2009, p. 1) summarizes how this instrument has been used lately: “Most  economists  are  of  the  opinion  that  antidumping
as little  to  do  with  ‘unfair’  trade.  In  general,  suspicions  are  high  that  domestic  industries  are  turning  to  antidumping
s a form  of  protectionism.”
This lack of transparency about the AD regulation has contributed to boost this practice and nowadays it is one
f the most used protection tools. Araújo et al. (2001) point out yet another reason for the vast use of this resource.
ccording to the authors, under the argument of “unfair trade”, these measures end up turning the attention away from
he lack of competitiveness of the domestic companies. It makes the antidumping  actions attractive as an instrument
f protection and grants them some political appeal.
Therefore, the AD measures, based on the fair-trade argument, are generally used to favor the less competitive
ompanies. Although this kind of protection not follow the paradigms of orthodox theory that each country should
xport what it produces with greater efficiency in a barrier-free environment (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1821; Heckscher,
919; Ohlin, 1933), the heterodox stream does not ignore the possible benefits caused by protection mechanisms. For the
4 According to Aggarwal (2004), the non-traditional users of AD would be using this tool as a way of retaliation against traditional users. According
o him, the retaliation would be the main reason to explain the increased number of AD by non-traditional countries. Once convergence would imply
n a reduction of AD cases by the main users and an increase in the use by non-traditional users, it could reduce the overall use of AD by reducing the
etaliation effect. The hypothesis that there could be some spatial effect on the opening of AD cases was proposed by Vandenbussche and Zanardi
2008). They argued that some countries could learn by seeing other countries using AD. This process of “learn by seeing” from nearby countries
ay generate clusters (with a geographical dimension) of AD users.
5 Knetter and Prusa (2003) disclose that two criteria must be met in order to have a dumping practice. First, there must be proof that the national
ndustry has suffered loss, such as a decline in profitability, caused by the importation. Secondly, the imported products must be commercialized at
nferior prices than the “normal price” of the domestic market.
6 Nelson (2004) states that: “A simple summary of research on dumping and antidumping would be that: dumping appears not to be much of a
roblem; but antidumping is a much worse problem than what its small coverage and marginal contribution to aggregate protection would imply.”
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latter group, free-trade could be harmful, mainly for the least developed and competitive economies. According to List
(1841), who became known for his favor toward the protection of “Infant Industries”, countries with underdeveloped
industries would not be able to compete with economies that hold a mature industrial park without some type of
protection or State intervention.7
In spite of the controversy regarding the AD use as an instrument of protection, there is an application that goes
beyond these two currents of economic thought. Theuringer and Weiss (2001) raised the hypothesis that the AD
mechanism could be used not only to favor the less competitive companies, but also those that already have a high
level of competitiveness. Thus, the AD instrument could cause an opposite effect to that one expected by its policy
makers. In other words, rather than inhibiting the unfair-trade by protecting the less competitive companies, it would
be acting as an entry barrier against new competitors, and consequently, it would be contributing to the strengthening
of the already consolidated companies. Firme and Vasconcelos (2012, p. 271) also point out this possibility for AD
instrument use. For them this mechanism could be used to inhibit the entry of new competitors in any specific market.
Peng et al. (2008, p. 925) argue that researches related to entry barriers have concentrated efforts on economic variables,
such as economies of scale and product differentiation. Therefore, papers based on institutional variables that consider
trade barriers, such as the AD laws, as an entry barrier are rare.8
Independently of the type of AD use, it has spread. Bloningen and Prusa (2001) state that, in the last 25 years, the
AD have emerged as one of the main tools of trade protection. While the traditional barriers, such as tariffs and quotas,
were eliminated by the GATT/OMC treaties,9 the AD spread.10 Quinn and Slayton (1982) reveal that in the 70s this
type of protection had evolved to the point that it became an explicitly discussed issue at the Tokyo round, promoted
by GATT/OMC during 1973–79.
Regarding the distribution of its use among countries, Davis (2009, p. 3) declared that the AD instrument suffered a
turnabout after 1994, with the end of the Uruguay Round: “In  terms  of  global  usage,  the  introduction  of  a requirement
for countries  to  report  anti-dumping  actions  in  the  1980s  revealed  the  US  and  EU  as  heaviest  users  throughout  the
1980s and  early  1990s,  followed  by  Australia.  They  continue  to  be heavy  users.  But  from  the  end  of  the  Uruguay  Round
in the  mid-1990s,  other  users  began  to  emerge,  and  developing  and  emerging  economies  now  constitute  the  majority
of users”.
However, Aggarwal (2004) states that developing countries are not yet entirely familiarized with the use of AD.
He argues that these countries are using it as a way of retaliate the traditional users due to their excessive number
of AD cases opened against developing countries. He suggests that an overall reduction in the use of AD could be
possible if traditional users could reduce the use against developing countries. To Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008)
the widespread use of AD among developing countries has helped to boost the overall use of this mechanism by
itself. According to them, there would be a “contagion effect” associated to AD (i.e.: some countries could start to use
AD just by seeing other nearby countries using it). The retaliation and the contagion effect could help to explain the
proliferation this tool after the Uruguay round.
7 The author states that the nations’ advantages (absolute and relative) are actually constructed/built and not inherited. Thus, the state should work
toward creating the necessary conditions for such advantages to excel, which many times requires an amount of protection for infant industries.
Based on List, diverse authors began to criticize the classical commercial liberalism (Prebisch, 1949, 1951; Kaldor, 1972, 1977, 1981; Thirlwall,
1979). Subsequently, Chang (2002), when debating the economy of the XIX century, would say that part of the liberalizing discourse of the classical
school would be influenced by the nationalist interests from the more developed economies of that time. The author wrote an interesting book on
this subject retracing the history of several countries that were considered developed at that time, concluding that many of them, including USA and
others, used protectionist practices before reaching a high level of development.
8 Regarding the possible use of AD measures as an entry barrier, Mascarenhas and Akker (1989) show that the obstacles that a firm needs to
overcome to enter into a new market would be the main motive for the formation and maintenance of groups and would help to explain the good
performance of companies, sectors and even countries. According to Porter (1979, 1989), if barriers did not exist any well succeeded strategy
would be quickly imitated and countries would tend toward equal profitability. Thus, once AD measures may hinder the entry of foreign firms, this
instrument could be used to maintain a regular market to domestic firms, avoiding the competition of new international firms.
9
“According to WTO statistics, industrialized countries have cut their tariffs on industrial products by an average 36 percent during the ﬁrst ﬁve
GATT rounds (1942–62), an average 37 percent in the Kennedy Round (1964–67), an average 33 percent in the Tokyo Round (1973–79), and an
average 38 percent in the Uruguay Round (1986–94).” (Ossa, 2011, p. 122–123).
10 The growth in AD cases was so intense that, in the words of Bloningen and Prusa (2001, p 1): “since 1980, GATT/WTO members have ﬁled
more complaints under the AD statute than under all other trade laws combined, or that more AD duties are now levied in any one year worldwide
than were levied in the entire period 1947–1970.”
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Graph 1. Number of Antidumping measures (AD) initiated and applied between 1995 and 2012 and the acceptance rate of these commercial
protection requests (applications/openings).
Source: Own elaboration according to WTO data (2013).
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tRegarding to Uruguay round, Prusa (1999) reveal that the antidumping  issue was one of the main topics of this round
f negotiations (which was marked by the opposite position between traditional and non-traditional countries about the
D use). “Broadly  stated,  the  debate  pitted  the  traditional  users  of  antidumping,  essentially  industrialized  countries
uch as  the  US  and  EC,  against  traditional  non-users,  primarily  developing  countries”  (Prusa, 1999, p. 1). The author
eveals that, due to the efforts of The USA and The European Community, it was not possible to restrict the use of the
D. Consequently, the Uruguay Round was not only incapable of reducing the AD use among the traditional users,
ut ended up encouraging the less traditional countries in its use. According to Zanardi (2004), this meeting ended
p boosting an expansion of the AD use among traditional users (such as The United States, Canada, The European
ommunity, Australia and New Zealand) as well as in countries without tradition in the use of antidumping  measures
such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, among others).
The Graph 1 shows that the number of AD cases initiated by the WTO’s countries actually rose at the end of the
ruguay Round (in 1994). The rise is noteworthy until 2001. From 2002 on, there seems to be a general decrease in
he use of such measures. Literature still does not completely grasp the facts that cause oscillations in the number of
D cases. Nonetheless, Ahn and Shin (2011), when analyzing the number of cases that were initiated between 1995
nd 2009, argue that “the  overall  trend  of  AD  investigations  clearly  shows  the  counter-cyclical  movement  that  the
ncreases of AD  investigations  during  the  early  and  the  late  2000s  have  coincided  with  global  economic  recession.”
his hypothesis is also defended by Bown (2011). According to him, the use of the major measures of trade protection
which include the antidumping) frequently rise when there is an economic crisis. He observed this phenomenon into
he following crises: 1990–1991, 1997–1998 and 2001–2002. After 2001–2002 recession, the number of AD started
o decline and became more stable. This reduction in the use of AD could be explained by the end of 2001–2002
ecession and due to the further liberalization negotiations, carried out by WTO members in 2001, under the ideas of
oha Round (Bown, 2011).11 For Feinberg (2010), the role of developing countries, regarding the use of AD, increased
fter Uruguay Round. Consequently, the AD cases started to depend, more and more, of these countries.12
In 2003, maybe due to the excess of cases initiated in the last period, the relation between the quantity of open cases
nd the quantity of AD measures applied, reached its peak: a percentage of 95.6%. This result may be explained by
he accumulation of judged measures in 2003. However, on the other hand, it could also indicate certain benevolence
f the regulative authorities toward the petitioners firms. Anyhow, this relationship has stabilized in the following
ears. In 2008, 2009 and 2012 the number of opened cases grew again. This new rise could be related to the American
11 The Doha Round was started in November 2001.
12 To Feinberg (2010, p. 8): “antidumping has largely become a problem of the developing world, both in terms of major importing country users
e.g., the three largest users in 2008 were India, Brazil, and Turkey, the three largest users in 2009 so far have been Pakistan, India, and Argentina),
nd of targets (with China by far the largest exporting country hit by antidumping petitions, but Thailand, Taiwan and Indonesia the next largest
argets of cases ﬁled in 2008)”.
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real-estate sector crisis, which spread throughout the world generating negative reflexes in the economic activities of
diverse countries.13
Therefore, this section showed that, because of the obscure regulation of the antidumping  practice, this mechanism
has become one of the main instruments of protection of our day. Although the Uruguay Round had discussed this
problem, it was not able to reduce the use of AD measures. Actually, several countries which were considered non-
traditional in the use of this resource began to use it more intensely at the end of this meeting. As mentioned in this
section, this phenomenon could be connected to the retaliation and the contagion effect. Furthermore, the increase in
the number of AD cases during this period led some authors to suggest that this instrument has being used as an entry
barrier in order to avoid new competitors and favor companies that are already competitive. Hence, given the current
utilization of the AD instrument, some issues arise: (1) which countries contributed more to the increase/decrease of
the number of AD cases after the Uruguay Round? (2) Which of them became the main targets of these measures? (3)
Could the AD use by a country be influenced by its neighbors (contagion effect)? (4) Are these countries converging
in terms of the use of this instrument? (5) How could they be grouped in terms of the AD use? (6) Are the more
competitive sectors being privileged?14 These are some issues that the methods introduced in the next section seek to
clarify.
3.  Methodology  and  database
3.1.  Some  trends  associated  to  the  AD  practice15
As shown in Graph 1, the amount of AD cases initiated between 1995 and 2012 seems to be decreasing, mainly after
2001. However, this Graph does not reveal who the most responsible for this decrease would be. Thus, an attempt was
made to test the trend of the AD use, associated to each country member of WTO, during this period. So, we verified
the trend, associated to each country, of opening AD and of being target of these measures. For this purpose, a simple
deterministic linear trend model was used, according to the description of Perron and Yabo (2009, p. 1)16:
NCt =  μ  +  βt  +  εt (1)
Where NCt are the AD cases initiated during the period t; μ  is the average or constant; β is a trend parameter, determined
by t = 1, . . ., n. Finally, εt is an error term.17
It is important to point out that the model proposed in Eq. (1) presents two weaknesses that we will not expound
upon in this paper. Firstly, it does not consider the possibility that other variables could interact with the trend variable
and, maybe, affect the results founded in Eq. (1).18 A second issue refers to the degree of freedom of the regressions.
Once the World  Trade  Organization  (WTO) database for countries and sectors are grouped in annual periodicity, there
were only 18 observations for each regression. Alternatively, we could have used smaller periodicities (bi-annual,
quarterly, monthly.  . .). Although this information has already been compiled by Bown (2014) and is available in the
World Bank website, we would need to make these database compatible with the 4125 AD cases initiated in the world
13 Niels and Francois (2006) remind us that the antidumping investigations in the USA and in the European Community are notably influenced by
macro-economic conditions such as the level of economic activity. Nevertheless, there are no indications that the number of initiated processes will
return to the high level that was seen in the 1998–2002 period.
14 The definition of “competitiveness” used in this article is based on the Exporting Base theory (see Section 3.4).
15 McGee (2008) and Bown (2011) have also analyzed the annual trend associated with the opening of AD cases. However, the first author has
relied only on graphical analysis and has focused only in the main Asian economies. Meanwhile, the second author has tested different kinds of
trends to several developed and developing countries.
16 In spite of being simple, this specification is still used in relevant articles. Vogelsang and Fomby (2002) used this function to evaluate the global
warming tendency. Bunzel and Vogelsang (2005), using the same equation, showed that there is a trend of deterioration of the trade terms associated
with the commerce between a country that export manufactured products and another one that export commodities. Regarding the antidumping
literature, Bown (2011) has also used this type of model in order to capture the trend of opening of AD cases, associated with importing and exporting
countries.
17 Note that, when we tested the trend of a country to be a target of AD measures, the NCt variable was actually, the number of cases in which this
country was target of AD measures in each t period.
18 Some authors suggest that macro-economic variables could influence the opening of AD cases (Aggarwal, 2004; Feinberg, 1989, 2005; Knetter
and Prusa, 2003; Niels and Francois, 2006; Vasconcelos and Firme, 2011). In spite of being a promising agenda, this was not the aim of this research.
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etween 1995 and 2012, what would be an exhaustive task and consist in itself of a new research agenda.19 Thus, the
esults presented in Tables 1 and 2 are merely an indicative of trend and do not settle the issue.
.2.  Grouping  of  AD  users  by  target  sectors
The aim of the Clusters  analysis (CA) method is to verify the existence of groups within a set of observations.
herefore, it was possible to group the WTO members according to the intensity of their use of AD measures by target
ector. Therefore, if a group of countries is concentrating the opening of AD cases against some specific sectors, the
A would be in charge of including them in the same cluster  or group. Thus, it was possible to group the members
f WTO according to the distribution of the AD measures initiated by these countries between 1995 and 2012 among
ectors. The first step of this procedure is the definition of a similarity criteria (or dissimilarity) and a process of
gglomeration (or disagglomeration) in order to maximize the homogeneity between the intra-group elements and
aximize the heterogeneity of the inter-group elements (Mingoti, 2007).20
Due to the wide use of the Euclidean distance,21 it was chosen as a measure of similarity (Manly, 1986; Kageyama
nd Leone, 1999; Pereira, 2002). In order to select which technique of agglomeration (or cluster  formation) will be
sed, we need to define whether the model is going to be a Hierarchical model or not. Andrade (2009, p. 63–64) argues
hat the non-hierarchical methods are preferable when working with an elevated amount of information. According to
im “the  computational  algorithms  used  in  the  non-hierarchical  methods  are  not  of  the  interactive  type,  yet  they  have
reater capacity  of  analysis  when  it  comes  to  data  clusters  with  large  numbers  of  observations  than  the  hierarchical
ethods.” However, when there are a reduced number of individuals, the hierarchical analysis presents the advantage
f exhibit the aggregation process of the whole sample. Thus, it is possible to trace a “historical tree” of the grouping
rocess, from the moment in which each individual is included alone in a single group (maximum homogeneity), until
he moment in which all individuals are in the same group (maximum heterogeneity). All this grouping process can be
iewed by a figure called “Dendogram” that allows recognizing the outliers from the data set (Timm, 2002).22 For this
esearch, the dendogram is attractive due to the reduced amount of information (just 47 countries initiated AD cases
ithin 1995–2012) that enabled a complete view of the individual (country) grouping process. Thus, the agglomerative
ierarchical analysis, which consists in initiating the grouping process considering each individual as a group, was
hosen. Thereafter, a measure of similarity is used to continually group the elements until there is only one group with
ll the individuals (Kageyama and Leone, 1999).23 Finally, a hierarchical grouping method must be defined. Literature
oints out 5 options: (1) simple linkage, (2) average linkage, (3) complete linkage, (4) centroids’ method, (5) Ward’s
ethod.24
.3.  The  inﬂuence  of  spatial  factors  on  the  AD  cases  and  convergenceThis section describes the methods used to test the existence of spatial autocorrelation and the convergence hypothesis
ssociated to the number of AD cases initiated by traditional and non-traditional countries during the period of 1995
19 In the case of Brazil, Vasconcelos and Firme (2011) used quarterly data instead of annual in order to verify whether the macroeconomic factors
ould explain the opening of AD cases.
20 It is important to remember that this method evaluates the interdependent relations among the variables without establishing a causal relationship
it is not a regression).
21 Considering an analysis for the case of 2 vectors, Xl and Xk, with l /= k, the Euclidian distance is: d(Xl, Xk) = 2
√[(Xl − Xk)I(Xl − Xk)]2,
here I represents an identity matrix.
22 The non-hierarchical techniques require a previous specification of the number of desired groups (k). Thus, in each stage of grouping process
ew clusters may be established through the division or junction of the groups formed in earlier steps until reaching the k groups, In other words, if
n any step of the algorithm two elements are placed in a same group, they may be replaced and not remain together in the final partition. Therefore,
n opposite to the hierarchical models, the possibility of building dendograms does not exist (Andrade, 2009; Mingoti, 2007).
23 The “Divisive” approach could be used too. In this case, dissimilarity criteria are used to disaggregate the initial group (with all individuals)
ntil each group contains one individual alone (Mingoti, 2007).
24 The average linkage produces groups with similar variance and it tends to present better partitions than the simple and complete linkages (Mingoti,
007) while the Ward’s method (1963) tends to produce clusters with minimum variance and with a similar amount of intra-group elements. Afonso
nd Melão (2007) tested these 5 methods and verified that only the average linkage and the Ward method created groups with economical coherence.
n this paper, we chose the average linkage.
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and 2012.25 In other words, it was verified whether the number of cases opened by a country can be explained by the
amount of cases initiated by its neighbors (if it is true, there will be spatial autocorrelation) and whether the number
of AD measures initiated by traditional and non-traditional countries tend to converge.
In order to measure the spatial autocorrelation, the Moran’s I  index, proposed by Cliff and Ord (1981), was calculated.
Thus, I values higher than their expected value E(I) = −1(n  −  1) indicate that there is a positive spatial autocorrelation.26
To Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) there would be a “contagion effect” associated to AD (i.e.: some countries could
start to use AD just by seeing other nearby countries using it). Therefore, we have used the Moran’s I test in order
to verify if there is some evidence that corroborate this contagion effect. Thereby, a positive value in the test would
indicate that the number of AD measures, opened by a country i, would increase if the number of AD measures, opened
by its neighborhood countries, increased (in this case, there would be an evidence of contagion effect). Formally, the
Moran’s I  statistic is:
Ii =
(
n
S0
)  [ (z′tWzt)
(z′zt)
]
t  =  1,  .  . .n (2)
Where zt is a vector with n  observations (measured by the deviation in relation to the average) for the t  year.27 W is a
matrix of spatial weights: the wii elements on the diagonal are equal to zero, while the wij elements indicate the way
in which a region i is spatially connected to another j. The So term is a scalar equal to the sum of all elements of W.28
Aiming to raise the rigor of this test; several spatial matrices were tested29 in order to identify which one would capture
the largest spatial autocorrelation associated to our variable of interest {NCt}  within the analyzed period.30
Having done this, the hypothesis of absolute convergence (β  convergence) was tested for the number of AD cases
initiated between 1995 and 2012. Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) stated that until the 80s there were only 5 users
of AD (Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand and USA). From this decade on, there was an accelerated growth in
the number of AD cases initiated by developing countries (new users). According to these authors, 61 countries have
started to adopt antidumping laws between 1980 and 2003. To them, the retaliation could explain this proliferation of
AD in the last years.
Zanardi (2006) argues that, although developing countries have started to use the AD as a way of retaliation against
the traditional users, the use of AD is no longer a simple question involving “developing versus  developed countries”.
According to him, the AD cases initiated by developing countries in the last years had this same group of countries as
targets. Therefore, it is possible that these countries have started a retaliation process among themselves. As mentioned
by Bown (2011), the great amount of AD cases involving developing countries has led the disputes to a “south-south”
context.
Nevertheless, Aggarwal (2004) states that developing countries are not yet entirely familiarized with the use of AD.
He argues that these countries are using it to retaliate the traditional users due to their excessive number of AD cases
against developing countries. He also suggests that an overall reduction in the use of AD could be possible if traditional
users could reduce their use against developing countries.
Therefore, this paper tries to verify if these AD users are converging in terms of the number of AD cases during 1995
and 2012. If this hypothesis is confirmed, there will be an indication that countries that adopted many AD measures in
the past are reducing the use of this resource, while those that were not contumacious users are increasing.
25 The spatial autocorrelation could confirm the “contagion effect” described by Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008), while the convergence among
traditional and nontraditional AD users could reduce the retaliation, as mentioned by Aggarwal (2004).
26 In this case, the majority of countries fit within the profile High-High (HH) and Low-Low (LL). Therefore, the countries that opened many AD
cases tend to have neighbors that have also initiated a high number of cases (HH) and the countries that have not used so much AD measures tend
to be near to the others that have also not used it intensely. In the case of negative spatial autocorrelation, associations such as High-Low (HL) and
Low-High (LH) prevail.
27 In this article zt = NCt. So, it represents the amount of AD cases initiated by the WTO members between 1995 and 2012.
28 When the spatial weight matrix is normalized on the row, and the elements of each row become equal to one, the Eq. (2) is expressed as
follows:Ii = (z′tWzt/z′tzt), and t = 1, . . . n.
29 Diverse specifications of spatial matrixes were tested for the nearest K neighbors (K = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10).
30 The selection of the spatial weight matrix is based on Baumont’s (2004, p. 13) criterion and have been used by Oliveira et al. (2011), Carvalho
and Almeida (2010), Maranduba and Almeida (2009), Firme and Simão Filho (2014). Therefore, according to this procedure the matrix of K = 2
nearest neighbors was chosen.
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For this purpose, the number of AD cases, opened by 232 countries, was subdivided in 2 periods of 9 years.31 Thus,
he average of the AD cases initiated between 1995 and 2003 was considered the initial period (t  −  1). Meanwhile, the
verage of the 2004–2012 was the subsequent period (t). This procedure avoids the incidence of zeros (in some years
here were countries which have not opened AD measures).
Returning to Graph 1 it is possible to notice that t  −  1 corresponds to a period of elevated number of antidumping
ases (just after the Uruguay Round, in 1994, diverse untraditional users began to use this instrument more intensely),
hereas the period t  is marked by the diminishing and relative stabilization of the AD use. This global diminishing
erified within these periods is not a guarantee that the number of AD cases is converging among the countries. For
his to occur, the intensive users in t  −  1 must be the largest responsible for the reduction of AD cases verified between
he periods.
Since this procedure of subdividing the sample can be considered ad hoc, we have also tested the convergence with
 panel data model. In this case, the yearly measures initiated by 46 WTO’s member (all of them AD users), between
995 and 2012, were considered.32
It is worth mentioning that the use of intensive variables (rather than the absolute ones) is preferable when using
patial data.33 According to Anselin (2005) it avoids the influence of the population size or the geographical area on
he variables. Therefore, this procedure diminishes the probability of obtaining spurious spatial correlations. Thus, 2
odels were estimated. One of them considered the number of AD cases in its absolute form (NCt), whilst the other
ondered the number of AD processes by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), measured in purchasing power parity
ollars (NCt/GDPt). The weighting of AD cases by some economic factor was also used by Zanardi (2006). According
o this author, considering only the number of antidumping cases initiated by a country would be unfair.
The convergence analysis in economy comes from the neoclassical work derived from Solow’s model (1956).34 In
his paper we have used an adapted specification of these neoclassical models and some potential spatial effects were
lso considered. Formally:
NCt =  β0 +  β1(NCt−1) +  ρW(NCt) +  ε  (Spatial Lag Model) (3)
ΔNCt =  β0 +  β1(NCt−1) +  u  Being : u  =  λWu  + ε  (Spatial Error Model) (4)
here: NCt represents the AD measures variation between 1995–2003 (t  −  1) and 2004–2012 (t); β0 is the constant
nd β1 is a coefficient that, when negative, indicates that there is convergence among the AD users. ρ  is a coefficient
hat follows the spatially lagged dependent variable. Thus, ρ  /=  0 suggests that there is spatial autocorrelation. u  is an
utoregressive spatial error term. Therefore, λ  /=  0 indicates that the errors are spatially correlated. Finally, ε represents
 normal distributed error term, with zero average and constant variance {ε  ∼  (0,)}  and W  is the spatial weights matrix
sed (i.e.: K  = 2 nearest neighbors – see footnote 30). We have also tested Eqs. (3) and (4) using intensive variables as
ollows:
(NC /GDP ) =  β +  β (NC /GDP ) +  ρW[(NC /GDP )] +  ε  (5)t t 0 1 t−1 t−1 t t
(NCt/GDPt) =  β0 +  β1(NCt−1/GDPt−1) +  u Where : u  =  λWu  +  ε  (6)
31 Firstly, we considered all the 232 countries presented in the world maps from Frame 1. Thus, both AD users as countries which do not use AD
ere included. Thereafter, in the models with panel data, only the 46 AD users were considered.
32 Usually, when applying models with panel data, we have to estimated a pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) using the Breusch-Pagan’s test
o verify if there is some unobserved effect (ci), in this case, the null hypothesis is: H0 : σ2c = 0. If H0 is true, POLS is the most indicated model,
therwise (if σ2c /= 0), we have to estimate the Random Effects (RE) and the Fixed Effects (FE) models, using the Hausman’s (1978) test to select
hich one should be used. This procedure verifies if the explanatory variables (Xit) are correlated with ci, being H0 : E[(ci |Xit)]. If H0 is true, both
E and RE are consistent, but RE will be more efficient, otherwise, if H0 is reject, only FE is consistent. In this case, the Breusch-Pagan’s test is
nnecessary. More details about panel data models in Wooldridge (2002).
33 To transform an absolute variable into an intensive (or spatially dense) one, it is necessary to divide it by some “intensity factor” (e.g.: per capita
ariables, per area variables, or yet, those divided by the amount of work or capital.
34 To Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), convergence is one of the key aspects of these models and implies that an economy that initially finds
tself below its steady-state tends to have a quicker growth. Thus, the poorer economies tend to exhibit higher growth rates than the more wealthy
conomies. Consequently, the income of these economies would tend to converge.
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Where: Eqs. (5) and (6) represent, respectively, the Spatial Lag and Spatial Error model. Both of these expressions are
using the intensive variables form (weighted by GDP). The β0, β1, ρ, λ, u, ε and W terms, included in (5) and (6), have
the same characteristics of Eqs. (3) and (4).35
The confirmation of convergence in Eqs. (3) and (4), in which case β1 is negative and significant, implies that any
country that adopted many AD measures in the past (traditional users) will adopt less in the future; while the reverse
is valid for the untraditional users. However, these specifications do not consider the economic size (GDP) of each
country. Therefore, convergence would be an improbable result, since it would indicate that, in the long run, countries
with a high GDP (e.g.: USA, China, among others) would converge, in absolute terms of AD use, with the less relevant
countries in terms of GDP.36 In Eqs. (5) and (6), the AD cases started by each country are weighted by the GDP.
Consequently, the weight of each country is considered and a convergence becomes more plausible.
3.4.  The  proﬁle  of  AD  users  according  to  the  type  of  protected  sector
This section verified if countries would be using AD to privilege the more competitive sectors in detriment of the
less competitive ones, as suggested by Theuringer and Weiss (2001).
For this purpose, the Exporting Base theory was utilized to define a criterion of competitiveness. Consequently, the
more representative sectors in the exportation’s agenda of their respective countries were considered more competitive.
This theory, developed initially by North (1955), was one of the first attempts to explain the different levels of regional
growth. According to it, there is a group of economic activities that generally contains markets outside the region and
would have the capacity to boost the growth, justifying some of the regional disparities. Thus, the rise of the exporting
base would exert a multiplying effect on the non-basic activities associated to the domestic market, increasing both the
employment level as the per capita income (Sirkin, 1959; Tiebout, 1977; Souza, 1980; Balassa, 1989).37 Therefore,
aiming to verify whether countries are privileging the more competitive sectors through the AD practice, the following
procedure was used:
Ij =  Corr
(
NCij∑
iNCij
,
EXPij∑
iEXPij
)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[(
NCi=1,j∑i=21
i=1 NCi,j
)
.  .  .
(
NCi=21,j∑i=21
i=1 NCi,j
)]
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
EXPi=1,j∑i=21
i=1 EXPi,j
)
.
.
.(
EXPi=21,j∑i=21
i=1 EXPi,j
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(7)
Where: Ij is a correlation index, associated to the country j, which measures how the distribution of the AD cases
initiated by this country j  against foreign sectors, is related to the sectoral distribution of the exportation of this country.
NCi,j is the number of AD cases initiated by the country j against products from sector i; EXPi,j represents the products
exported by the country j  that coming from the domestic sector i (values in US$ purchasing power parity). Additionally,
as j represents the WTO country member that initiated AD cases between 1995 and 2012, j = 1, . . ., 47. In the case of
i, the 21 sections of the MERCOSUL Common Nomenclature (MCN) were used to define the sectors. Thus, i  = 1, . . .,
21.38
Therefore, if a country “j” is an intensive exporter of products coming from a group “g” of domestic sectors, and
at the same time, concentrates a good part of its AD measures against these same sectors abroad “g*”, it will indicate
35 It is worth mentioning that all years between 1995 and 2012 are included separately in the panel data models. Therefore,
NCt = (NCt − NCt−1)/NCt−1, where: t = 1995, 1996, . . ., 2011, 2012. The same is valid to (NCt/GDPt).
36 Thus, there would be a number of AD measures common to these countries (e.g.: they would initiate “x” cases p.a.).
37 Note that the exporting base alone is not able to explain the wholly global economic growth, especially when a region becomes industrialized
and expands its relevance. After all, if you think on the World as a big country, you will conclude that there is no export; nevertheless, the income
still grows (Tiebout, 1977).
38 Ij was multiplied by 100. Therefore, this index may vary between −100 (in this case, the country would initiate AD processes in order to favor the
least relevant sectors in terms of exportation) and +100 (where AD measures would be used opportunely by the sectors with the greatest exportation
potential).
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hat this country is favoring the most competitive domestic sectors through the AD practice and Ij will be larger than
ero.
In order to make the result of this index a little more reliable, Eq. (8) was estimated to verify if the effect verified
ia index would change after including the retaliation effect:
NCi =  μ +  β1EXPi +  β2NC∗i +  εt (8)
here: NCi represents the distribution of the AD cases initiated by a country i  against foreign sectors (i.e.: 21 sections
f the MCN) and EXPi is the sectoral distribution of the exportation of the country i among the 21 sections of the MCN
both specified just like in Eq. (7). μ  represents the model’s constant, β1 and β2 are parameters and εt is an error term.
nce retaliation is one of the main reasons to explain the use of AD (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2008) and its effect
ould explain the concentration of AD among those sectors, the distribution of AD cases, opened between 1995 and
012, against the country i (NC∗i ) were included into the model.
.5.  Database
The annual number of AD cases opened, discriminated by applicant and targeted countries and by the 21 sections
f the MERCOSUL Common Nomenclature (MCN), is available at World Trade Organization (WTO, 2013). The
urrent annual GDP valued at Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), used in Section 3.3, was obtained at the World
conomic Outlook Database available at the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2013). Whereas the annual exports,
isaggregated by sectors and countries, used in Section 3.4, are available at the International  Trade  Center  (ITC,
013).39
.  Empirical  results
The results coming from Eq. (1) reveal that there was a general downward trend in the opening of AD cases between
995 and 2012 (Table 1). As mentioned by Bown (2011), this reduction in the use of AD could be explained by the
nd of 2001–2002 recession and the further liberalization carried out by WTO members after 2001 under the ideas of
oha Round.
Considering all members of WTO, denominated “world” in Table 1, we see that an average of 296 cases was initiated
er year. Furthermore, we detected a decreasing trend of approximately 7 cases p.a., which represents a yearly decrease
f almost 2.4% per year.40 India, European Union and USA were the main responsible for the verified reduction during
his period. Together, they contributed to reduce around 4.6 AD measures p.a., which represents more than 65% of the
otal trend associated to AD cases. Individually, Venezuela seems to have made the most effort in order to reduce the
D. The country showed a reduction of more than 7% per year. However, its participation in the total cases is too timid
barely 0.75%) to influence the global trend in a significant way. On the other hand, Brazil appears to be running in an
pposite direction and was the only great AD user that achieved a positive and significant trend of opening cases.41
esides this, its yearly growth rate (7.7% p.a.) was the largest among the analyzed countries.
Table 2 shows that China was not only the greatest target of AD cases between 1995 and 2012, but was also the
nly big country to present a positive trend in this aspect. Every year, approximately 1.5 new cases involving this
ountry were added to its high average of almost 35 cases per year. Although we have verified an overall downward
rend of almost 2.4% per year, this does not appear to occur with China. Actually, the cases against this country rose
y approximately 4.4% per year. Similar results were found by McGee (2008) and Bown (2011). The last one revealed
39 Although the exportation presents disaggregation for 99 chapters of NCM, we needed to aggregate them among 21 sections.
40 The trend coefficient (presented in Tables 1, 3 and 5) reflects, in absolute terms, the path of the dependent variable. Thus, it shows the number
f AD cases that should be added to the average every year. Therefore, when dividing this value by the constant (which is the average number of
D cases initiated every year) it is possible to obtain the trend in relative terms. In other words, this procedure verifies the trend in relation to the
verage. Therefore, by multiplying this value by 100 we can get an annual relative trend in percentage values. So, if a country opens 50 cases per
ear in average (constant = 50) and a decreasing trend of 5 cases per year is found. The relative effect will be (− 5/50) × 100 = −10%.
41 Countries with more than 100 AD cases accumulated between 1995 and 2012 were considered “great users”. In this way, Turkey also fits this
rofile. However, the trend associated to this country, although positive, is not significant.
332 V. de Azevedo Couto Firme, C.R.F. Vasconcelos / EconomiA 16 (2015) 321–342
Table 1
Estimated effect on countries that are requiring protection via AD processes (importers) (Considering the number of initiated investigations between
1995 and 2012).a
Countries Total cases Total participation (%) Estimate via OLS: Obs = 18 Relative effect (%)
Constant Trend R2
Positive trend
Brazil 258 6.25 8.29** 0.64* 0.17 7.72
China 195 4.73 6.65 0.44 0.06 –
Colombia 56 1.36 2.54* 0.06 0.02 –
Pakistan 71 1.72 −2.14 0.64** 0.26 –
Taipei – China 56 1.36 0.94 0.09 0.04 –
Thailand 56 1.36 1.76 0.14 0.02 –
Turkey 154 3.73 6.10 0.26 0.03 –
Ukraine 40 0.97 −0.39 0.27*** 0.40 –
Negative trend
South Africa 216 5.24 27.96*** −1.68*** 0.55 −6.01
Argentina 301 7.30 23.14*** −0.68 0.13 –
Australia 241 5.84 21.59*** −0.86* 0.22 −3.98
Canada 165 4.00 15.25*** −0.64** 0.23 −4.20
Chile 20 0.48 2.19*** −0.11* 0.16 −5.02
South Korea 112 2.72 9.83*** −0.38 0.13 –
Egypt 71 1.72 5.88** −0.20 0.06 –
India 663 16.07 37.41*** −0.06 0.00 –
Indonesia 96 2.33 5.63*** −0.03 0.00 –
Israel 45 1.09 3.84*** −0.14 0.08 –
Malaysia 48 1.16 3.65** −0.10 0.04 –
Mexico 106 2.57 8.97*** −0.32* 0.21 −3.57
New Zealand 56 1.36 6.31*** −0.34** 0.34 −5.39
Peru 71 1.72 6.40*** −0.26 0.15 –
European Union 444 10.76 39.20*** −1.53** 0.34 −3.90
USA 465 11.27 39.50*** −1.44* 0.17 −3.65
Venezuela 31 0.75 5.12*** −0.36*** 0.42 −7.03
The rest of the World 111 2.69 10.37*** −0.44* 0.18 −4.24
WORLD 4125 100.00 296.00*** −7.03** 0.28 −2.38
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the results of EVIEWS software and WTO data (2013).
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
The relative effect refers to the trend divided by the constant (calculated only when both are significant).
a The E.U. members (and their membership year) are: Germany (1952), Austria (1995), Belgium (1952), Bulgaria (2007), Cyprus
(2004), Denmark (1973), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain (1986), Lithuania (2004), Luxemburg (1952), Malta (2004), Netherlands
(1952), Poland (2004), Portugal (1986), United Kingdom (1973), Czech Republic (2004), Romania (2007) and Switzerland (1995)
(http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index pt.htm), access in 2013.
that, between 1990 and 2009, China was target of almost 4 times more AD measures than the second country with
more cases against it.
Among those that have stopped being target of AD measures, United Kingdom, Poland, Spain, France, Italy and
Germany can be highlighted. On average, the number AD cases against products from these countries fell around 5.7%
per year. Another relevant result refers to Brazil. It appears that Brazilian products also became less recurring targets
of AD (decrease of almost 3.6% p.a.). Thus, it is curious to notice that its AD use is rising (Table 1), in spite of the
reduction of cases opened against Brazil (Table 2). According to Moreira and Ornelas (2008), Brazil has gotten a good
performance on the last dispute settlements of WTO (with favorable results in many disputes). Therefore, it could
encourage the use of AD by this country. However, the end of 2001–2002 recession and the liberalizing ideas proposed
at Doha Round seem to have been efficient to decrease the number of AD cases in other WTO’s countries (Bown,
2011). Thus, the reduction of AD cases, against Brazil, can be just following the general trend of WTO members.
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Table 2
Estimated effect on countries that are target of AD processes (exporters) (Considering the number of initiated investigations between 1995 and
2012).
Countries Case total Total participation (%) Estimate via OLS: Obs = 18 Relative effect (%)
Constant Trend R2
Positive trend
Argentina 35 0.85 1.89** 0.01 0.00 –
China 884 21.43 34.70*** 1.52** 0.26 4.38
Malaysia 105 2.55 5.54*** 0.03 0.00 –
U. E. (Other Countries) 90 2.18 4.35** 0.07 0.01 –
Vietnam 34 0.82 0.04 0.19** 0.32 –
Negative trend
South Africa 62 1.50 6.15*** −0.28** 0.28 −4.55
Germany 93 2.25 10.51*** −0.56*** 0.65 −5.33
Brazil 116 2.81 9.78*** −0.35** 0.25 −3.58
Canada 39 0.95 3.14*** −0.10 0.09 –
Chile 31 0.75 2.77*** −0.11 0.13 –
South Korea 299 7.25 23.19*** −0.69** 0.24 −2.98
Spain 47 1.14 5.76*** −0.33*** 0.53 −5.73
France 43 1.04 4.95*** −0.27** 0.31 −5.45
India 160 3.88 11.89*** −0.32* 0.17 −2.69
Indonesia 168 4.07 12.11*** −0.29 0.11 –
Italy 52 1.26 5.97*** −0.32*** 0.55 −5.36
Japan 170 4.12 14.32*** −0.51** 0.27 −3.56
México 56 1.36 4.21*** −0.12 0.08 –
Poland 31 0.75 3.91*** −0.23*** 0.50 −5.88
Romania 38 0.92 3.86*** −0.18* 0.19 −4.66
United Kingdom 44 1.07 6.07*** −0.38*** 0.53 −6.26
Russia 127 3.08 11.51*** −0.47* 0.21 −4.08
Singapore 47 1.14 3.84** −0.13 0.04 –
Taipei – China 223 5.41 14.63*** −0.24 0.06 –
Thailand 168 4.07 10.63*** −0.13 0.03 –
Turkey 57 1.38 3.20*** −0.00 0.00 –
Ukraine 67 1.62 6.54*** −0.30** 0.30 −4.59
USA 237 5.75 17.20*** −0.42** 0.24 −2.44
The rest of the World 602 14.59 53.33*** −3.26*** 0.40 −6.11
WORLD 4125 100.00 296.00*** −7.03*** 0.28 −2.38
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the results of the EVIEWS software and WTO data (2013).
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
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he relative effect refers to the trend divided by the constant (calculated only when both are significant).
The rise in the use of antidumping  measures against China and the reduction of cases against European countries
ould be reflecting a change in international trade that occurred in the last years. According to Amiti and Freund (2008,
. 2): “China’s  real  exports  increased  by  more  than  500  percent  over  the  last  15  years.”42 Therefore, the massive entry
f Chinese products in the international Market probably contributed to the increase of the AD cases against China. On
he other hand, the fall of productivity verified in the European countries in the later years could have driven this group
way from the focus of the AD measures. Kappel (2011, p. 3), when comparing the European Union (EU) members
ith the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) declares that: “In  the  last  three  decades,  having  started  at  a  high
evel, the  EU’s  growth  rates  are  on  average  lower  than  those  of  the  regional  powers.  This  indicates  a lack  of  dynamism
hich gives  rise  to  a  creeping  loss  of  economic  signiﬁcance.”
42 According to these authors, the explanation for this phenomenon would be resultant of a strong change in the Chinese exportation structure. –
China’s export structure has transformed dramatically since 1992.”
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Fig. 1. Dendogram of the Users of Antidumping Measures by target sector: 1995 to 2012.
Footnotes: (1) Sectors without any AD case were excluded. (2) The sectors’ code is: I. Live animals and animal products; II. Vegetable Products;
III. Fats, oils and animal and vegetable wax; IV. Convenience Foods; beverages, liquors, vinegar, tobacco; V. Mineral Products; VI. Chemical and
related Industries; VII. Plastic and rubber Articles; VIII. Casing, skin, leather, bags and etc.; IX. Wood, coal, cork and basketry articles; X. Cellulose,
Paper, cardboard and articles; XI. Textile and articles; XII. Shoes, headgear, umbrellas, artificial flowers and etc.; XIII. Stone works, plaster, cement,
asbestos, mica, glass and etc.; XIV. Pearls, stones and precious metals; coins; XV. Common Metals and its works; XVI. Machinery and Electric
Equip.; XVII. Transportation Material; XVIII. Watches, Cameras and Video Recorders, Medical Devices; XX. Diverse Manufactured Articles.
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the results of the STATA software and WTO data (2013).
Fig. 1 shows the countries’ similarity concerning the distribution of AD use among the 21 sections of the MCN
during the period of 1995 to 2012. Note that, the unions closer to zero, on the vertical axis, are more homogeneous,
while the more distant ones would be outliers.  Therefore, Brazil, Australia and South Africa comprise an important
group (G2) that represents almost 18% of all the AD cases initiated in this period. This cluster seems to be intense in
the AD use against the Common Metal Industry and its Works (XV), Plastic and Rubber Items (VII) and Chemicals
(VI). On average, 25% of the cases initiated by these countries have targeted the XV sector, 23% the VII sector and
14% the VI sector.
Another group, a little less cohesive than the latter one, but yet more intense in the use of the AD practice against
the Metals sector (XV) is formed by Argentina, European Union, Mexico, Indonesia and USA (G1). On average, 38%
of the cases initiated by these countries have this sector as a target. The Chemical industry is the second sector most
affected and is involved in more than 15% of the cases. Notably, these 5 economies represent almost 34% of all the
AD cases initiated between 1995 and 2012. Besides these, China, India, Pakistan and Japan (G4), which together are
responsible for almost 23% of the AD cases, appear as an Asiatic group that is extremely intense in applied measures
against the Chemical sector (VI). This sector alone was responsibility for almost 50% of the AD cases initiated by
these countries. Only the group comprised of Canada, Thailand, Chinese Taipei and Venezuela (G5) focused more AD
measures against one sector alone (more than 60% of the measures initiated by this group has the Metal sector as a
target). Finally, the Machinery and Electric Equipment sector (XVI) is a great target of AD measures initiated in Israel,
South Korea, Ukraine and New Zealand (G3). This sector is target of almost 16% of the cases initiated by this group
(Fig. 1).
The Map A shows which countries initiated more AD cases between 1995 and 2012 (Frame 1). The results infer
that India (677), USA (469), European Union (451), Argentina (303), Brazil (279), Australia (247) and South Africa
(217) became the main users of AD after the Uruguay Round. According to Davis (2009), the USA, European Union
and Australia were already considered traditional users of this tool even before this period. On Map B, the number of
cases was divided by the GPD of each country in order to consider the economic weight of each one. This procedure
showed the excess of Argentina (38.3) and South Africa (31.2) in their use of the AD instrument.
Still in Frame 1, the positive (although small) result of the Moran’s  I, presented in Map A, reveals a small indication
of spatial autocorrelation AA-BB type. In other words, countries that initiate many AD cases (traditional users) would
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ource: Elaboration with base on the Softwares ArcView and Geoda and database from WTO (2013) and IMF (2013).
end to be close to countries that also open a high number of processes. The reverse also applies to the case of non-
raditional users. Thus, there would be some evidence of contagion effect, as proposed by Vandenbussche and Zanardi
2008). A curious fact occurs when the economic weight of these countries was considered. In this case, the Moran’s  I
resented in Map B more than doubled in relation to Map A (going from 0.05 to 0.11). This result indicates that there
ay be some “neighborhood effect” associated to the AD processes. Therefore, the number of AD cases opened by a
ountry can be affected by its neighbors.
The division of the AD cases in 2 periods (t  = ∑20122004NC  and t  − 1 = ∑20031995NC) allowed us to verify whether the
umber of cases is converging among 232 countries. The results, shown in Table 3, reveal that convergence does not
xist when the economic weight of these countries is not considered (where ΔNCt is the dependent variable – models
a”, “b” and “c”). This was an expected result (see Section 3.3) and indicates that, even in the long run, countries with
ifferent levels of GDP will not use AD measures in a similar fashion. This means that “big” countries will continue
pening more cases than the “small” ones.
However, there seems to be convergence when the economic weight of the countries is considered [where
(NCt/PIBt) is the dependent variable – models “g”, “h” and “i”]. Therefore, countries like Argentina that have
een using a high number of AD measures, even having a small participation in world economy, would tend to reduce
he use of this resource, while countries like Japan, who initiated only 7 cases during the whole period, would tend to
se it more. Consequently, both would converge to an approximate number of measures in the long run (Table 3).
In spite of these results, we found convergence, either considering or not the economic weight, while only the 46
TO’s members (users of AD) were considered (panel data models “d”, “e”, “f”, “j”, “k” and “l” from Table 3).
herefore, countries could be converging their use of AD in both cases [i.e.: considering (NCt) or (NCt/PIBt)].
As mentioned by Aggarwal (2004), the retaliation effect could be reduced if the traditional users were able to reduce
heir use of AD against nontraditional countries. Thus, the convergence could be a good way of reducing the overall
se of AD. We also have tested whether the variation in AD cases could be influenced by the variation in the cases
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Table 3
Convergence and spatial effects on the variation of AD cases opened between 1995 and 2012.
Cross-section data considering 232 countries:
Convergence and spatial effects analysis (Obs: 232)
Panel data considering the 46 WTO’s members:
Only convergence analysis (Obs: 799)
Dependent variable: NCt
(a) (b) (c) POLS (d) RE (e) FE (f)
Constant 4.75 4.76 4.78 21.70*** 22.45*** 44.40***
NCt−1 −1.60 −1.60 −1.59 −1.00* −1.15** −5.51***
W ΔNCt – 0.01 – –
W εt – – 0.01 –
R2 0.0045 0.0047 0.0047 0.0076 0.0076 0.0900
AIC 2869.73 2971.69 2869.70 9863.58 – 9738.16
BIC 2876.62 2882.03 2876.59 9872.95 – 9747.52
Dependent variable: (NCt/PIBt)
(g) (h) (i) POLS (j) RE (k) FE (l)
Constant 0.86 1.01 0.86 19.47*** 19.78*** 22.17***
(NCt−1/GDPt−1) −1.57*** −1.56*** −1.56*** −0.55*** −0.57*** −0.77***
W [(NCt/GDPt)] – 0.40 – – – –
W εt – – 0.01 – – –
R2 0.0586 0.0598 0.0589 0.0225 0.0225 0.0388
AIC 2674.77 2676.55 2674.72 9735.11 – 9668.16
BIC 2681.66 2686.89 2681.62 9733.48 – 9677.52
Source: Own Elaboration based on ArcView, Geoda and STATA Softwares and on WTO (2013) and IMF (2013) data.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
The cross-section models have considered NCt =
[(∑2012
2004NC
)
−
(∑2003
1995NC
)]
/
(∑2003
1995NC
)
, while the panel data models consider
NCt = (NCt − NCt−1)/NCt−1, where t = 1995, . . ., 2012.
Hausman’s test (1978):
(f) vs. (e): χ2 = 80.6; Prob . > χ2 = 0.00.
(l) vs. (k): χ2 = 12.7; Prob . > χ2 = 0.00.
initiated by the neighborhood (spatial lag model – “b” and “h” from Table 3) and if another unknown spatial factor
could explain this process (spatial error model – “c” and “i”). Nevertheless, these effects were not significant in any of
the estimated models (Table 3).
The correlation between AD measures initiated between 1995 and 2012 by countries members of WTO (distributed
by target sector) and the exports of these countries (also distributed by sectors) shows that, in some cases, AD measures
may be used to benefit sectors that already show a high level of competitiveness (Table 4).43 Although most of the
countries do not appear to be favoring sectors in a systematic way, since extreme coefficients (close to 100 or −100)
were rare, some cases need attention.
Among those with a high coefficient, we can mention two great users of the AD practice. Turkey, responsible for
opening 162 AD cases, obtained a coefficient equal to 58.7, while the European Union, which opened 451 processes,
obtained an index of 50.4. Therefore, these two economies present a profile that indicates a favoring of the more
competitive sectors through the antidumping  practice. However, it is noteworthy that this index, in spite of indicating a
43 It is important to remember that an index close to 100 indicates that a country “y”, intensive exporter of products originating from a sector “z”,
tends to concentrate a good part of its AD measures against products coming from this same sector “z” located abroad. Thus, based on the hypothesis
that a country intensive in the exportation of a specific product is efficient in its production (see Section 3.4), there would be an indication that this
country is privileging the more competitive sectors rather than that ones with less competitive capacity. Analogically, a coefficient near to −100
would indicate that the sectors privileged by AD practice are the less competitive ones.
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Table 4
Profile of the antidumping users according the type of protected sector (index ranging from −100 to 100).
Positive correlation (+) Negative correlation (−)
Lithuania 87.17 Bulgaria −0.05
Panama 77.25 Morocco −0.13
Venezuela 72.75 Honduras −0.26
Trinidad and Tobago 70.45 Indonesia −0.38
Costa Rica 64.64 Egypt −0.61
Turkey 58.67 China −1.75
European Union 50.40 Japan −2.06
Ecuador 36.49 Thailand −4.04
Chile 36.30 Brazil −4.13
Korea Republic 35.75 New Zealand −6.47
India 33.34 Australia −8.20
Guatemala 32.47 Colombia −9.28
Jamaica 29.74 Malaysia −10.54
Poland 15.36 Israel −11.70
United States of America 14.98 Paraguay −12.15
Dominican Republic 14.45 Czech Republic −12.19
Pakistan 13.59 Philippines −13.52
Canada 7.78 Slovenia −15.56
Peru 7.44 Jordan −15.64
South Africa 5.70 Argentina −18.26
Taipei Chinese 5.24 Uruguay −21.27
Mexico 4.54
Latvia 2.98
Ukraine 1.17
Nicaragua 0.89
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ource: Own elaboration based on STATA software and WTO (2013) and IMF (2013) data.
rofile associated to AD users, it does not settle the issue and is subject to problems associated to data aggregation.44
hus, there could be another explanation for the concentration of these measures. Davis (2009, p. 1) highlights that
he European Union has intensified the AD use against foreign products belonging to sectors in which the European
omparative advantage is declining.
Regarding the negative coefficients (that indicate cases where the less competitive sectors are favored by AD
ractice), the results are less recurrent and had less magnitude than the positive ones. Among the analyzed countries,
he smallest index (−18.3) was obtained by Argentina. So, this country could be using AD measures as an instrument
f industrial policy, aiming to protect their less competitive domestic industries from external competition. Although
ome results draw attention, most countries showed coefficients of small magnitude. South Africa (5.7), Mexico (4.5),
hina (−1.7) and Brazil (−4.1) achieved coefficients not far from zero. These results indicate a small or inexistent
orrelation between the use of AD measures and the degree of domestic sector competitiveness. In other words, we
annot affirm that these countries are privileging the more or less competitive sectors through AD practice.
In order to make our index a little more reliable, we tested if the most expressive results of Table 4 would be
aintained after including the retaliation effect. Thus, a model was estimated (see Eq. (8)) with the distribution of the
D cases initiated by a country i on the left side (dependent variable) and the distribution of the exportation of thisountry i and the distribution of AD cases opened against the country i on the right side (explanatory variables). The
esults helped us to verify if the effect of the distribution of the exportation would change after including the retaliation
ffect (Table 5).
44 Note that the analysis of these coefficients is affected by the disaggregation of the sectors. Thus, the smaller the disaggregation, the greater will
e the possibility in obtaining misleading results. This is because at the limit (with only one sector containing all products), all AD measures initiated
y a country would have this sector (abroad) as a target. But, since this sector (domestic) is also responsible for 100% of the exported products by
his country, the result would lead the researcher to conclude that the country considered is privileging a competitive sector, when it may not be the
ase.
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Table 5
The Effect of sectoral distribution of the exportation and retaliation on the use of antidumping.
Turkey European Union South Korea India United States Argentina
EXPi 0.887*** 0.711* 0.748** 0.242* 0.310 0.153 0.532 0.210 0.290 0.160 −0.210 −0.396
NC∗i 0.152 0.992*** 0.458** 0.862*** 0.333 0.472
Cons. 0.592 0.721 1.329 −1.230 3.633* 2.050 2.461 −0.378 3.738 2.673 6.369** 4.866*
R2 0.34 0.37 0.25 0.88 0.13 0.39 0.11 0.65 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.18
R2 adj. 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.87 0.08 0.31 0.06 0.60 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 0.08
AIC 132.22 133.44 134.27 101.04 130.38 125.69 143.02 127.41 150.13 150.55 132.01 130.87
BIC 134.11 136.28 136.16 103.87 132.27 128.53 144.91 130.25 152.02 153.38 133.9 133.71
Source: Own elaboration based on STATA software and WTO (2013) and IMF (2013) data.
Only countries with index higher than 10 or lesser than −10 and with more than 100 AD measures, accumulated between 1995 and 2012, were considered.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
(
T
r
c
a
a
a
a
s
5
t
G
(
u
R
t
u
c
u
W
w
o
t
t
b
c
w
n
r
T
a
A
g
C
E
m
t
g
o
i
s
p
a
CV. de Azevedo Couto Firme, C.R.F. Vasconcelos / EconomiA 16 (2015) 321–342 339
Similarly to Table 4, the results from Table 5 showed a positive relation between the distribution of the exportation
EXPi) and the distribution of the AD cases initiated by Turkey, European Union, South Korea, India and United States.
herefore, these economies would be favoring the most competitive sectors via AD. Nevertheless, the estimation
evealed that only the relation verified in Turkey and the European Union was significant. When the distribution of AD
ases opened against these countries (NC∗i ) was added in order to capture the retaliation effect, we noted a positive
nd significant coefficient to European Union, South Korea and India. Thus, there is evidence that these countries
re using AD as a retaliation mechanism. In the case of European Union and India, the improvement of R2 and the
djusted R2, after including NC∗i , indicated a strong motivation to use AD to retaliate other users. However, the signal
nd significance of EXPi, to Turkey and European Union, does not changed when NC∗i was included. So, both of them
eem to be favoring the most competitive sectors, just as we had found in Table 4.
.  Conclusion
The antidumping  literature revealed that, due to its lack of transparent legislation, that frequently favors the petitioner,
he antidumping  instrument (AD) has become one of the most important protectionist barriers of this day. Although
ATT/OMC have discussed this problem in the Tokyo rounds (1973–1979) and, more emphatically, in Uruguay
1986–1994), the traditional users of AD, headed by USA and European Union, prevented imposing restrictions to its
se. Thus, countries that were not considered big users of AD began using it with more intensity after the Uruguay
ound. To Aggarwal (2004), these countries, without tradition in using AD, would be using this tool to retaliate
raditional users. According to him, this way of using could be reduced if the traditional users were able to reduce their
se of AD against nontraditional countries. However, the challenge to inhibit the AD use can be encouraging other
ountries to use it, generating what Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) have called contagion effect. This excessive
se has led authors to suggest that AD is far from its original purpose of avoiding unfair competition. Theuringer and
eiss (2001) have suggested that AD could be being used to benefit the big businesses’ interests in detriment of firms
ith reduced level of competitiveness.
Therefore, the goal of this article was to analyze the evolution of the AD use after the Uruguay Round, in the period
f 1995 to 2012. For this, several techniques were used aiming to identify the main AD users and which trend of using
his tool could be associated to them. Besides this, the hypothesis that the number of AD cases could converge among
he countries, which could reduce the retaliation effect, was verified. We also tested if the number of AD cases opened
y a country could be explained by the amount of cases initiated by its neighbors, which would be an indicative of
ontagion effect. Finally, a criterion was created and a model was estimated in order to define whether the countries
ould be favoring the more competitive sectors through the AD practice.
Although the AD cases have risen significantly between 1995 and 2001 (as a result of the Uruguay Round), we
oticed a general downward trend associated to AD use, in the period of 1995 to 2012, at almost 2.4% per year. This
eduction can be associated to the end of 2001–2002 recession and the liberalizing ideas proposed at Doha Round.
he main responsible for this reduction were India, European Union and USA. Meanwhile, Brazil seems to follow
n opposite direction and was the only great user that achieved a positive and significant trend of using antidumping.
mong the AD targets, China was not only the most affected by AD as was also the only great economy to present a
rowth trend in this area. In spite of the general reduction verified on the number of AD cases, the processes against
hina rose almost 4.4% per year. It can be explained by the sharp rise of Chinese exportations in recent years.
On the other hand, the European countries are among those that stopped being target of AD cases. It seems that the
uropean productivity loss accumulated in the last 3 decades, may have taken this group away from the focus of AD
easures. In addition, the Brazilian products became less recurring targets AD as well. Thus, it is curious to notice that
he use of this instrument by this country is rising in spite of the reduction of cases against it. Probably, the Brazil’s
ood results on the last dispute settlements of WTO have encouraged the use of AD by this country while the reduction
f AD cases, against Brazil, have just followed the general trend of WTO members.
The cluster  analysis, revealed that Brazil, Australia and South Africa, which represent 18% of the AD cases initiated
n the period, are using this resource intensely against the Metal and its Works, Plastic and Rubber Products and Chemical
ectors. Meanwhile, Argentina, European Union, Mexico, Indonesia and USA, which respond for almost 34% of the
rocesses, are using the AD practice even more intensely against the Metal sector. Besides these, China, India, Pakistan
nd Japan, responsible for almost 23% of the cases, appear as an Asian group that is extreme in use of AD against the
hemical sector.
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The data also indicated that India, USA, European Union, Argentina, Brazil, Australia and South Africa have
become the main AD users after the Uruguay Round. Since USA, The European Union and Australia were already
considered traditional users, the other mentioned countries arise as the main new users of AD. However, when the
number of AD cases was weighted by the GDP of each country, it is clear that Argentina and South Africa are using
AD measures much more intensely than the others. The spatial analysis of the data revealed, through Moran’s  I, the
presence of a weak spatial autocorrelation of the AA-BB type. In other words, countries that initiate many AD cases
would tend to be close to other countries that also open a high number of processes. Thus, there would be a weak
evidence of contagion effect. Nonetheless, when pondering the AD processes by the GDP, the Moran’s  I  coefficient
more than double. Therefore, the “neighborhood effect” on the number of AD cases is stronger when the economic
relevance of each country is considered.
Regarding the convergence in the AD use, the results with cross section data have not indicated signs of convergence
while the economic weight of the 232 countries considered was not considered. This result was already expected and
indicates that, even on the long run, countries with different levels of GDP will not use AD measures in a similar
fashion. In other words, big countries will continue opening more cases than the small ones. However, the convergence
is confirmed when the AD cases are pondered by the GDP of each country. Therefore, countries like Argentina, which
uses a high number of AD measures even having a small participation in world economy, would tend to reduce the use
of this resource. While countries like Japan, which has a great GDP and was responsible for only 0.2% cases during
the whole period, would tend to use it more. Consequently, both would converge to an approximate number of AD
cases in the long run.
In spite of these results, we found convergence in the AD using, either considering or not the economic weight of
46 WTO’s members (users of antidumping), while using panel data models. Therefore, countries could be converging
their use of AD in both cases.
To Aggarwal (2004), the retaliation effect could be reduced if the traditional users were able to reduce their use of
AD against nontraditional countries. Thus, the convergence could be a good way of reducing the overall use of AD.
Furthermore, the spatial models have revealed that the variation in AD cases initiated by a country does not seem to be
influenced by the variation in the amount of cases opened by its neighbors or of any other unknown spatial component.
Therefore, we cannot confirm the contagion effect.
Finally, the criteria used to verify if there are countries using AD to privilege the more competitive sectors indicated
that, although most of the countries may not appear to be favoring sectors systematically, there are some cases that
call for attention. Among the main AD users, Turkey and the European Union have presented this profile. On the other
hand, Argentina seems to be using AD as an instrument of industrial policy, aiming to protect their less competitive
domestic industries from external competition. However, our estimations have showed that this effect is only significant
to Turkey and European Union. This result did not change even after including a variable to capture the retaliation
effect. So, both countries seem to be favoring the most competitive sectors. In order to improve these results and
confirm which kind of sectors has been favored by AD, we recommend, as a future research agenda, a higher sectoral
disaggregation and the inclusion of other relevant variables to explain the use of AD into the model.
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